Technical barriers to trade and SPS measures and export dynamics by Besedina, Elena
NUPI Working Paper 842
Technical barriers to trade 
and SPS measures and 
export dynamics 
Elena Besedina
Department of International Economics
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher: 
Copyright: 
 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
© Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2015 
 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The 
text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author. 
 
Visiting address: 
Address: 
 
Internet: 
E-mail: 
Fax: 
Tel: 
 
C.J. Hambros plass 2d 
P.O. Box 8159 Dep. 
NO-0033 Oslo, Norway 
www.nupi.no 
info@nupi.no 
[+ 47] 22 99 40 50 
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00 
 
Technical barriers to 
trade and SPS measures 
and export dynamics  
 
Elena Besedina, Kyiv School of Economics  
Abstract 
Traditional trade policy tools like tariffs and quotas are being actively 
replaced with non-tariff policy tools (NTB) by governments throughout 
the world. In this paper we investigate how introduction of two types of 
non-tariff measures, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures, affects exporters in different countries. 
According to the heterogeneous firms trade theory commenced with 
Melitz model any additional cost of exporting will force some of the 
firms to stop exporting, thus reducing the number of exporting firms 
and products exported. We test this prediction using two primary data 
sources: WTO data on trade concerns related to TBT and SPS measures 
and World Bank Exporter Dynamics Database controlling for other 
factors influencing export dynamics. Contrary to the previous studies 
our results seem to suggest no casual effect of the introduction of NTBs 
on export concentration and firms’ exit/entry rates. 
 
 
 
 
Published by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
 
 
*  This paper is written with financial support by “Non-tariff barriers, food safety and 
international food trade” joint project of Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI),  University of Life Sciences and Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) funded by 
the Research Council of Norway (Contract no. 216742/O10). 
 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................ 2 
1. Introduction ................................................................................... 4 
2. Theoretical background.................................................................. 9 
3. Data description ........................................................................... 12 
4. Empirical Strategy ........................................................................ 15 
Dependent variable: ....................................................................... 15 
Trade barriers variables: ................................................................. 18 
Control variables: ............................................................................ 19 
Country size and economic development level .......................... 19 
Sector specific variables ............................................................. 19 
Institutional and business environment variables ..................... 20 
Econometric concerns ..................................................................... 22 
5. Results ......................................................................................... 23 
5.1. Introduction of a TBT/SPS measure ......................................... 23 
5.2. Changes in the number of TBT/SPS measures.......................... 25 
6. Concluding remarks ..................................................................... 26 
References ....................................................................................... 27 
Appendix ......................................................................................... 37 
List of countries in the WB Exporter Dynamics Database ................ 37 
 
 
 Introduction 
Recent decades have seen significant reduction in the average level of 
tariffs applied by most countries to a majority of the traded goods. But 
have we really come closer to free trade in at least in final goods? Now 
when majority of countries are members of the World Trade Organi-
zation and are constrained to adhere to tariff schedules and conces-
sions, governments often find other ways to ‘protect’ domestic market 
from the outside competition. Recent episodes of trade wars between 
Russia and Ukraine (both the WTO members), when Ukrainian food 
products (cheese, and the most recent case, chocolates and candies) 
were declared by the Russian controlling authorities to violate safety 
standards, clearly show that free trade still remains an objective rather 
than an achievement.  
The importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as substantial impede-
ments to international trade has been increasingly recognized by 
economists, policy makers and international organizations. The World 
Bank published a book on NTBs where different authors contributed 
chapters addressing many aspects of the NTBs (World Bank, 2012). The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) itself devoted its entire 2012 World 
Trade Report to such measures with a particular focus on technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. 
According to these two publications, there has been a steady increase 
in the application of the non-tariff measures with recent economic 
crisis only intensifying the usage of such measures. Importantly, the 
largest countries either in terms of population (China and India) or size 
of the economy (EU and USA) are the most ‘active’ ones in this area. 
The increased usage of NTBs is also confirmed in various business 
surveys across the globe (WTO, 2012).  
According to the WTO agreements countries have to notify the WTO 
about the measures they are planning to impose. Hence, countries’ self-
notifications are the first source to look for the information about non-
tariff measures. According to Kallummal (2012), the notifications 
about non-tariff measures increased more than fivefold from just 
around 600 notifications in 1995 to more than 3000 notifications in 
2010. At the same time, partner countries started to officially raise 
concerns over the NTBs more often within the WTO framework. Thus, 
partner countries’ concerns constitute the second source of information 
about the NTBs.  
Nicita and Gourdon (2013) explore another source of data on NTBs 
created jointly by UNCTAD and the World Bank, which by the end of 
2011 contained detailed information about such measures in 26 
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countries. They also confirm that the use of NTMs varies considerably 
across countries with NTBs in agriculture and food industry being more 
frequent and stringent than those in the manufacturing sector. 
Availability of the new datasets on NTBs allowed researchers to 
study the effect of these measures on trade volumes (intensive margin). 
The most common approach used in the literature is a gravity model 
which is based on the new trade theory models commenced by 
Krugman and widely used in the international trade research. Disdier et 
al. (2008) investigate impact of TBTs and SPS measures on trade in 
agricultural products using information from countries’ self-notifica-
tions to the WTO. In their econometric analysis they use three different 
variables: TBT/SPS dummy, frequency index and ad-valorem equiva-
lent discussed below. Frequency index is defined as the percentage of 
products to which one or more NTMs are applied within a product cate-
gory. Disdier et al. (2008) find that TBTs and SPS measures have nega-
tive significant effect on bilateral agricultural trade flows regardless of 
the type of variable used. When they look separately at the agricultural 
sub-sectors they find that for some sub-sectors the effect is zero and for 
some it is actually positive giving support to the explanation that 
stricter rules work as a signal of quality for consumers. Similar findings 
are demonstrated by earlier contributions as well (Moenius, 2004, 
Fontagné et al., 2005, etc.)  
Another approach is to use simulation to quantify the effect of the 
NTBs. Kee et al. (2009) using data for more than 90 countries estimate 
the “ad-valorem equivalent (AVE)” of the core NTM (that include price 
control measures, quantitative restrictions, monopolistic measures, 
antidumping and countervailing measures and technical regulations) 
or “agricultural domestic support” for each 6-digit category of the 
Harmonized System (HS) where NTMs were applied. The quantity 
impact of the NTMs is obtained as the difference between actual 
imports and predicted imports following Leamer comparative 
advantage approach. The quantity impact is then converted into an 
AVE using the import demand elasticities. In other words, similar to the 
case of quotas an AVE shows the level of an ad-valorem tariff that 
would have the same effect on trade flows as a particular NTM. Their 
estimates suggest that on average non-tariff measure is comparable to a 
hypothetical 12 percent tariff.  
In another cross-country study that looks specifically at the 
technical standards and regulations, Chen et al. (2006) examine effect 
of these trade barriers on activities of exporting firms’ measured as (1) 
a share in total exports and (2) number of overseas markets served. In 
their theoretical model standards and regulation impose additional 
cost on exporters and meeting a standard in each export market is 
assumed to create two types of costs: fixed and variable costs. To test 
their hypotheses of negative relationship between exporting activities 
and TBT they use the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade Survey 
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(2002) of 619 firms in 17 developing countries. In line with their 
theoretical model, they find that different technical trade barriers 
reduce firms’ export capacity (export share) and market diversification 
(number of export destinations). It is worth pointing out that different 
standard and regulations reduce export share to a different extent (e.g. 
testing procedures lead to a 9% decline while the effect of information 
barriers is twice as large, 18%). 
Several papers look at the effect of technical barriers and SPS 
measures on trade flows of specific countries. Using data on Senegalese 
exporters Maertens and Swinnen (2009) demonstrate that the EU 
standards and regulations actually promoted exports of fruit and 
vegetables from Senegal to the EU. However, stricter standards and 
regulation imposed costs on exporters. And since in many developing 
countries smaller firms are often financially constrained and cannot 
easily comply with higher standards this has lead to more consolida-
tion and vertical integration among Senegalese fruit and vegetables 
exporters. Nakakeeto (2011) also focuses on Senegal and two other 
countries--Uganda and Mali. She investigates the effect of the different 
NTMs on trade in foodstuff between these countries and the rest of the 
world. She shows that type of the NTM matters: while technical 
measures are found to promote trade, the non-technical measures do 
not seem to affect trade in food products in the above countries. A case 
study analyzes the effect of technical barriers to trade on Chinese trade 
in textile products and notices that these measures have both positive 
and negative effect on textile exporters (Jiang, 2008). On the one hand, 
stricter standards increase exporting costs and hence reduce current 
trade flows and number of exporters but, on the other hand, they 
improve future performance by creating incentives for the textile 
producers to modernize production processes to comply with the rules. 
In this paper we are investigating the effect of the introduction of an 
NTM (either TBT or SPS) on the export dynamics, with a special focus 
on trade in foodstuff. In particular, we examine how TBT and SPS 
measures affect export concentration and diversification (both at pro-
duct and destination level) as well as entry and exit of firms into 
exporting. If introduction of an NTM increases costs of exporting, the 
‘new’ new trade theory started by Melitz (2003) predicts that some 
exporters will stop to export and thus the number of exported varieties 
will fall as well (extensive margin).   
To identify the effect of the NTBs on export dynamics we need to 
control for other possible factors that can influence export diversi-
fication and firms’ churning rates. Here we should first make a clear 
distinction between the types of diversification studied in the literature. 
Export flows can be diversified in terms of varieties (products), markets 
(destinations) and producers (exporters). Majority of existing studies 
look at the product diversification of exports. Agosin et al. (2011) use a 
panel dataset and divide the determinants of export diversification into 
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three groups: (1) institutional factors (e.g. level of financial develop-
ment), (2) comparative advantage factors (e.g. endowments), and (3) 
macroeconomic factors (e.g. exchange rate volatility). Their results 
from GMM estimation are not robust as none of the factors has a consis-
tent impact on export diversification across specification. Parteka and 
Tamberi (2011) also use a panel dataset covering 60 countries and 
twenty years (1985-2004) and a large set of explanatory variables to 
determine which country-specific factors can explain the degree of 
export concentration at the product level. Similarly to Agosin et al. 
(2011), these factors are grouped into several categories like insti-
tutional quality, geography, etc. Only country size, trade regime and 
proximity to major markets are found to be robust determinants of the 
export diversification. Balavac (2012) estimates the impact of different 
trade barriers and country capacity factors on the degree of export 
diversification using GMM approach. The degree of product diversifi-
cation is measured by Theil index.  She finds that, in accordance with 
the theory, higher export costs, presence of tariffs and transportation 
costs, proxied by distance, decrease export diversification. 
Shepard (2007) studies how harmonization of the EU standards in 
three sectors--textile, clothing and footwear industries--has affected 
extensive and intensive margins of trade. He uses disaggregated trade 
data (8-digit level) and shows that higher number of standards in a 
particular category is associated with the smaller number of varieties 
exported by partner countries. At the same time harmonization of 
standards across markets have the opposite effect increasing export 
diversity.  
A number of recent studies look at the exporting firms’ performance 
(including entry and exit into exporting) using firm-level data and are 
particularly relevant for our analysis. Reyes (2011) studies the 
response of the US manufacturing firms to harmonization of the 
standards by the EU countries. He finds that such harmonization (i.e. 
decrease in technical trade barriers) promoted entrance of new firms 
that previously served other than EU markets and decreased export 
volumes of the incumbent firms. Reis and Taglioni (2013) investigate 
how growth rate of Pakistani exports at the firm-destination-product-
year level is affected by a number of factors related to foreign demand 
and exporting costs measured by number of days needed to clear 
customs procedures in destination countries. Both factors related to 
foreign demand and exporting costs are found to be important 
determinants of export growth in Pakistan.  
Fontagné et al. (2013) use complete customs data on French firm-
level exports over the period 1995-2005 to study the effect of TBT and 
SPS on the exports dynamics of French firms. Our paper is closely 
related to Fontagné et al. (2013) as we use the same NTB dataset as 
they do. In particular, they construct firm/sector/destination/year 
dependent variables at 4-digit aggregation level (HS4) to define: (1) 
Elena Besedina 
 
8 
probability of exporting and stopping to export (dummy variables for 
exporting and exit) (2) export value and (3) export unit value (prices). 
Authors find that presence of SPS measure reduces probability of 
exporting and exported value and increases probability of exit. Higher 
exporting costs are also partially shifted to foreign customers as the 
presence of SPS is associated with higher unit values. Authors also find 
that the effect of SPS measure is lower for larger exporters, which is 
consistent with Melitz model implications (Melitz, 2003). 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several important 
aspects. First, we study the effect of SPS and TBT on the food exports 
dynamics in 42 countries which represent different parts of the world 
and different levels of development. The sectoral indicators used in the 
analysis are constructed from the firm-level customs data and hence 
provide much richer basis for the analysis than even the most 
disaggregated trade flows1. Second, we study a different question than 
Fontagné et al. (2013) do since we examine how introduction (one-time 
event) of a TBT or/and SPS affects export concentration at firm, product 
and destination level as well as entry/exit rate.  Third, we include both 
TBTs and SPS measures in our analysis as our research question is not 
affected by TBT data limitations discussed further. 
We estimate the effect of the introduction of an NTM measure on 
several dependent variables describing export dynamics. In order to 
disentangle the effect of TBT and SPS measures we use a set of control 
variables suggested by economic theory and/or used in the empirical 
literature. Since our empirical analysis may suffer from unobserved 
heterogeneity we use first-difference model to estimate the effect of 
NTMs. The results of our analysis are at odds with the existing literature 
as we do not find any effect of the introduction of the TBTs and SPS 
measures on the export dynamics at the sectoral level. At the same 
time, costs of exporting (both in terms of money and time) appear to 
influence export product and market diversification as well as 
concentration at the level of firms.  
This paper is structured as follows. Next section provides a brief 
discussion of the underlying trade theory. Section 3 describes data 
sources used in the analysis while Section 4 outlines empirical model 
and provides economic intuition for the expected signs of the variables 
of interest and choice of control variables. Results are presented in 
Section 5 which is followed by concluding remarks.  
 
                                                          
1  Unfortunately access to the primary firm-level data is restricted by the data 
provider (World Bank). Data are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
 Theoretical background 
Traditional trade models predict that countries will specialize in the 
goods in which they have comparative advantage either due to 
technology/productivity (Ricardo model) or factor endowments 
(Heckscher-Ohlin model). In these models goods are produced in 
perfectly competitive markets hence there will be many producers of 
the same good and hence many of them will export.  
In the trade models with monopolistic competition identical firms 
produce differentiated products and consumers exhibit ‘love for 
variety’ (Krugman, 1979, 1980). Country will produce a large amount 
of differentiated goods.  Monopolistic competition is preserved in the 
heterogeneous firms models (Melitz, 2003; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; 
Melitz and Ottaviano, 2007, etc.) however, in these models only the 
most productive firms export. The partitioning of firms occurs because 
of the costs of exporting. For a given level of exporting costs countries 
with more productive firms will have a larger number of exporters and 
products shipped to overseas markets. On the other hand if exporting 
costs increase, these models predict reduction in the number of 
exporters and hence number of products exported.  
Here, the distinction should be made between fixed costs of 
exporting and variable costs often called trade costs. Economists 
usually model and estimate trade costs as multiplicative (iceberg) 
costs; however, recently several papers introduced so called additive 
costs (Berman et al, 2012; Irarrazabal et al. 2013). While for iceberg 
costs, the price of the good matters as more expensive goods are 
costlier to export, with additive costs there is no price advantage for 
exporters: both low-price and high-price producers have to incur the 
same level of costs. The additive costs are more consistent with reality 
since many low-priced perishable goods face significant exporting 
costs (customs, certification, etc.) as compared to high-priced electro-
nics for example. Berman et al. (2012) interpret these additive costs as 
local distribution costs that are independent of firms’ underlying 
productivity. In presence of these costs, impact of changes in exchange 
rates on exporters varies by firms’ productivity: currency depreciation, 
increases export prices (mark-ups) of high productivity firms and 
increases export volumes of low productivity firms.  
Empirical evidence of the presence of large trade costs other than 
those associated with tariffs suggests that along with distribution and 
transportation costs, compliance costs are also significant. The costs 
associated with compliance with non-tariff measures usually (but not 
always) do not depend on firms’ productivity, mark-ups and prices 
Elena Besedina 
 
10 
charged. For example, additional product certification required to enter 
foreign market will generate the same costs for all exporting firms.  
Irarrazabal et al. (2013) estimate additive trade costs relative to median 
price for Norwegian firms and find that, on average, Norwegian firms 
bear additive trade costs at the level of 14 per cent of the median price 
in the sector.  
Even though the trade theory does not specifically address the 
question of the non-tariff barriers that include technical regulations 
and sanitary and phytosanitary measures the logic of the models for 
fixed/additive costs can be easily extended to the TBT and SPS mea-
sures. These measures can be thought of as part of the fixed/additive 
costs for exporting firms. Technical barriers to trade and SPS measures 
impose compliance costs on exporters. These compliance costs are 
related to potential adjustments of production process, certification 
procedures needed to meet the requirements of the countries imposing 
such regulations and standards (Schlueter et al., 2009). In Melitz-type 
model these costs are expected to have negative impact on the volumes 
of trade, number of exporters and number of goods exported. At the 
same time, the average exports per firm may actually increase, as the 
export market shares are reallocated towards more efficient firms. 
Graphically implications of Melitz-type models with and without 
TBT and SPS measures can be presented as follows (Figure 1): 
1. In the model, all firms vary by productivity level and since 
exporting is costly, only most productive firms export.  
2. Without non-tariff trade barriers, the cutoff level of costs 
(inverse of productivity) for firms in country B to export to 
country A is CFT. All firms to the left of this cutoff export to 
country A. 
3. Once a TBT/SPS measure is imposed, exporters have to bear 
additional costs and hence cutoff level moves to the left and 
becomes CTB. Firms that are located between CFT and CTB 
(shaded area) exported under free trade but were the least 
productive among exporters. Now with additional costs they are 
no longer able to compete in foreign market (country A) and 
hence will only serve domestic market of country B.  
4. This implies that we should observe fewer exporters and since 
in the model each exporter produces one particular differrenti-
ated good the number of variety should fall as well.  
This analysis will equally apply to both types of exporting costs, fixed 
and variable, associated with the new non-tariff measures. This 
analysis can be extended to case with many countries. For example, 
suppose there are three countries A, B and C engaged in bilateral trade 
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(i.e. firms from B serve both A and C). Again, suppose country A 
imposes a non-tariff measure for exporters from B and C. Since some 
exporters will exit market of country A, then the number of 
destinations for these exporters will decrease. [ADD Chaney ?] 
Figure 1. Impoact of introduction of NTMs in Melitz type model 
 
   
 
0 CTB c CFT 
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 Data description  
Several data sources are used in this paper. First, the data on technical 
barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) 
are provided by the World Trade Organization. The metadata are col-
lected from the minutes of the meetings of the respective Committees 
(TBT Committee and SPS Committee) or from countries’ notifications to 
the WTO about measures imposed on imports. In the first case, the 
affected countries raise their concerns during the meetings about the 
barriers maintained by partner country/countries. For example, on 
June 5 2009 during the TBT Committee meeting Norway raised con-
cerns, which were also supported by Canada, about the EU trade 
restrictions for seal products. The EU notified the WTO about such 
restrictions in March 2009 (recorded as G/TBT/N/EEC/249). According 
to the Norway’s representative, these trade restrictions would signify-
cantly affect trade between Norway and the EU but also Norwegian 
trade shipments that transit through the EU territory.  This concern is 
recorded in the TBT measures dataset under number 222 with the 
information about the maintaining country (EU), affected/concerned 
countries (Norway, Canada, Iceland and Brazil), time it was first raised, 
type of the measure (technical regulation) and product type (seal 
products, HS code: 430170).  
In the case of notification, the country that imposed technical or SPS 
measure notifies the WTO about such measure before its imposition 
according to the WTO agreements on SPS and TBT. In this paper we use 
data about concerns raised by trading partners. Our motivation to use 
concerns dataset is that first, in case of notification, the measure may 
actually be introduced much later than it is notified or even not intro-
duced at all. Second, if countries do raise concerns about the measures 
imposed by partner countries then these measures are viewed as sub-
stantial barriers to exports. Overall the dataset contains information on 
concerns raised about 318 and 312 TBT and SPS measures, respect-
tively. Prevailing majority of two types of measures affects products in 
more than one HS4 category. However, for some measures there is no 
information about the product affected and consequently about HS 
category it belongs to. Thus, the final numbers of the measures used in 
the analysis are 283 and 273, respectively. 
TBT and SPS measures are further classified according to the object-
tive of the measure. The SPS measures refer to only one objective while 
TBT measures as a rule refer to several objectives. We assumed that the 
first objective mentioned is the most important one. Given this assump-
tion, the TBT measures are most frequently imposed to protect human 
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health and safety, while SPS measures are primarily related to animal 
health concerns (Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively).  
Figure 2. Distribution of TBT measures according to the objective 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of SPS measures according to the objective 
 
 
A more detailed description of the above dataset can be found in 
Fontagné et al. (2013). 
Second, data about exporting firms come from the World Bank Export-
ers database that contains aggregated information about exporters 
from 42 developing and high-income economies over 1997-2011.  The 
data is an unbalanced panel and the information for majority of the 
countries is available from 2000.  The greatest potential advantage of 
this dataset is that allows to empirically analyze dynamic aspects of 
exporters’ behavior.  
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The Database contains information at country-year-product level 
(HS 2-digit, HS 4-digit, or HS 6-digit) about main characteristics of the 
exporters in each country, including size of the exporting sector, ave-
rage exporter size, exporter growth rates, entry, exit and survival rates; 
as well as information about concentration/diversification of export 
flows (such as Herfindahl index, share of top exporters, number of 
products and destinations per exporter) and unit value of exports per 
exporter, product or market (Cebeci et al., 2012). 
Given that information for majority of TBT and SPS measures is 
available only for 4-digit disaggregation level our analysis is conducted 
at HS4 disaggregation level.  
There is a large variation in the dataset across sectors and across 
countries. For example, over this period, countries, on average, 
exported fish and seafood products in seven 4-digit categories, 
displaying significant variability in terms of number of product lines: 
from one line for Laos to 7 lines for majority of the countries. There is 
also a considerable variation in the number of exporters within each 4-
digit category across countries, ranging from 0 (for some countries in 
every category) to more than 1338 exporters (Mexico in 0306 – 
“Crustaceans, live, fresh etc.”) but majority of fish and seafood cate-
gories have few exporters (Figure 3 below). More detailed description of 
the dataset can be found in Cebeci et al. (2012). This is in line with the 
findings of Bernard et al. (2007) that “engaging in international trade 
is an exceedingly rare activity”. 
The data for control variables come from multiple sources: World 
Development Indicators, World Governance Indicators, Economic 
Freedom indicators. The variables used in the econometric analysis 
are discussed in the next section. 
Figure 3. Distribution of exporters across 4-digit fish and seafood categories 
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 Empirical Strategy 
In our benchmark analysis we look only at the effect of the introduction 
of a measure on export dynamics. We are interested in the effect of 
introduction of the measure which can be viewed as an exogenous 
shock on exporters, not presence of the measure(s) in particular sectors 
over time. The primary and the most important reason for our focus on 
the introduction of the measure is that the original Melitz model is a 
comparative static model and hence makes predictions about the one-
time change in economic variables in response to exogenous shocks 
(change in trade costs).  
The presence of the non-tariff barriers can be studied in the light of 
how firms adjust to the presence of the SPS or TBT measures, for 
example, by diversifying across products and/or markets. If one wants 
to study the effect of the presence of a non-tariff measure she needs to 
know if this measure is still applied in a given year. The SPS concerns 
dataset can be used to study this effect as well as it does contain 
information on the status of the concern (whether it was resolved or 
not) and date of resolution. Differently, from the SPS concerns, the TBT 
measures dataset does not have information about the resolution/ 
termination date.    
To study the effect of the introduction of the TBT and SPS measures 
on the export dynamics we estimate the following empirical model in 
first differences: 
 
where  
Dependent variable: 
ΔYijt is the change in an export dynamic variable for sector j in country i 
in period t from the list below from t-1 to t: 
NUM_EXP    Number of exporters     
H-H_index    Herfindahl-Hirschman Index    
PROD_DIV   Average number of HS6 products per exporter  
MARKET_DIV   Average number of destinations per exporter 
ENTRY   Entry rate (# Entrantst / # Exporters t * 100) 
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EXIT  Exit rate (# Entrants t / # Exporters t-1 * 100) 
The choice of the first-differences model allows to get rid of potential 
unobserved heterogeneity in the 4-digit sectors in different countries, 
which if pooled OLS is used would lead to bias in estimates. The under-
lying assumption behind this model is that unobserved heterogeneity is 
time invariant and hence can be cleared by differencing across period. 
The second important assumption which should hold to make first-
differenced estimator unbiased is that changes in right-hand side vari-
ables are uncorrelated with error terms (Wooldridge, 2002). Changes in 
Xs and error term can be correlated if important variables that are cor-
related with other regressors are omitted from the model. To mitigate 
this potential problems we will include a wide range of controls. Some 
researchers use fixed effect models instead (e.g. Medin and Melchior, 
2014) to deal with unobserved heterogeneity. We believe that in our 
case the first-difference model is more appropriate since some of 
regressors are potentially non-stationary (GDP per capita, population) 
and FD model removes any unit roots in the variables.  
The expected signs of the effect of the TBT and SPS variables on 
different export dynamics variables as well as economic explanation 
are provided below. 
Technical barriers to trade and SPS measures and export dynamics 17 
 
Indicator Expected 
sign 
Explanation 
NUM_EXP   - Introduction of a TBT/SPS measure brings 
additional costs associated with compliance 
and hence will impede some firms to export. 
This will result in smaller number of exporters 
in a particular category following introduction 
of the measure.   
H-H_index 
 
+ Introduction of a TBT/SPS measure brings 
additional costs associated with compliance. 
As hypothesized above, these additional costs 
associated with compliance will decrease the 
number of exporting firms. Also since large 
exporters are less financially constrained and 
have higher turnout it is easier for them to 
comply with the new rules both operationally 
and financially. Hence exports are likely to 
become more concentrated in the hands of 
fewer larger exporters: HHI is expected to 
increase after introduction of a TBT/SPS 
measure.  
PROD_DIV -/+ 
 
 
The effect of the introduction of a TBT/SPS 
measure is ambiguous since:  
(1) firm can try to diversify away from affected 
variety/market, increasing number of products 
shipped/markets served. (+)  
(2) firm may not be able to afford to export the 
affected variety/to affected market and will 
discontinue exporting the affected variety/to 
affected market (-).  
Second explanation is consistent with Melitz 
model.  
MARK_DIV -/+ 
EXIT   + In Melitz model, additional trade costs (change 
in exporting cutoff) force the least productive 
firms to discontinue exporting: additional 
costs associated with compliance with a new 
TBT/SPS will increase the exit rate from 
exporting. 
ENTRY - Introduction of a TBT/SPS and additional costs 
associated with compliance will impede new 
firms to enter export markets decreasing entry 
rate. 
 
Descriptive statistics for a set of dependent variables presented in Table 
1 demonstrates significant variability across sector/country pairs. On 
average, 35 firms export goods within a particular 4-digit sector with 
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the maximum number exceeding 3000 (wine exporters from Spain). 
The exports seem to be notably concentrated which is confirmed by a 
rather high average value of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Exporters 
tend to export fewer products within 4-digit sector and serve on 
average two destinations. The latter is consistent with the estimates by 
Cebeci et al. (2012) of the average share of exporters and of total 
exports accounted for by single-product single-destination firms at 
country level over the period 2006-2008.2 According to their estimates, 
in majority of the 42 countries covered in the dataset more than one 
third of exporters are of this type (and in some countries this number is 
even higher, e.g. 45.4% in Albania). At the same time, this type of firms 
account only for less than 3 percent of total exports in majority of 
countries. We also observe a high degree of churning: many firms that 
exit are replaced by new entrants.3  
Trade barriers variables: 
ΔTBTij,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one TBT measure was 
introduced and applied to products exported by country i in the sector 
4-digit sector j at time t-1 but was not present at t-2. The subscript i is 
not accidental as it varies across countries as well since some measures 
are maintained by exporting country itself and hence does not affect 
country’s exports in this sector. Whenever it is the case, TBT dummy is 
set to zero for the specific country maintaining the measure, while for 
the rest of the countries this dummy variable is equal to 1.  
ΔSPSij,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one SPS measure 
was introduced and applied to products exported by country i in the 
sector 4-digit sector j at time t-1 but was not present at t-2. By the same 
logic, SPS dummy variable also varies across countries.  
Clearly, the effect of the new measure may vary depending on 
whether this sector is already been affected by other measures 
introduced before. Since we are interested in the effect of the 
introduction of such measures on export dynamics we limit our 
attention only to sectors where no such measures were present at t-2 to 
rule out the effect of the measures introduced earlier.  
Since the dummy variables defined above do not take into account 
the number of TBT or SPS measures, one can argue that the effect of 
introduction of TBT/SPS will be stronger if more than one measure is 
introduced. In order to control for this, we replace the two trade 
dummy variables with two continuous variables, which count the 
change in the number of such measures maintained in a particular 4-
digit sector from time t-2 to time t-1 (TBT_countij,t-1 and SPS_countij,t-1, 
                                                          
2  Cebeci et al. (2012) use disaggregated firm-level data from these 42 countries.  
3  The correlation between exit and entry rate is extremely high and exceeds 90% 
(Cebeci et al., 2012).  
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respectively). Then we re-estimate our empirical model. Note that these 
variables can be negative if the number of such measures declined from 
t-2 to t-1. Interestingly, whereas introduction of SPS measures and 
introduction of TBTs is not correlated, changes in the number of such 
measures is positively correlated (correlation coefficient is above 40%).  
Control variables: 
The set of control variables is chosen based on trade theory and recent 
empirical literature. Similarly to dependent variables, the control 
variables are also first differenced (defined as the change from period t-
1 to period t).  
Country size and economic development level 
GDP_PCAPit – log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
Level of economic development can affect export dynamics and, in 
particular, the degree of diversification at product and market level as 
well as the number of exporters. In particular rich countries are 
expected to have larger number of exporters and be more diversified 
(Agosin et al., 2011)  
POP_TOT it – log of total population 
Large countries have larger number of firms operating in the economy 
and hence can be expected to have more exporting firms. Also due to 
the potential presence of increasing returns to scale in manufacturing 
industries, small countries usually are more specialized than large ones 
(Parteka and Tamberi, 2011). 
AGR_EMPit – employment in agriculture, % of total.  
Share of population employed in agriculture can be a proxy for 
comparative advantage in agricultural production. This variable is used 
only for a subsample limited to trade in foodstuff.  
Landlockedi – dummy variable =1 if country does not have access to 
sea/ocean and 0 otherwise.    
Variable Landlockedi is used for analysis of export dynamics in fish and 
seafood sector as access to sea is an important factor influencing this 
sector.  
Sector specific variables 
Importance ijt - share of HS4 sector in total exports of the country. 
Larger export sectors are very likely to serve more destinations and to 
have more product varieties. In addition, if these sectors are favored by 
government, which often happens in developing countries, more firms 
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will be attracted to these sectors and hence these sectors will be 
characterized by a higher entry rate. 
 S_TYPEj - Sector type is defined according to Rauch classification 
where goods are classified in differentiated goods (base category), 
reference priced goods (group 2) and homogeneous goods (group 3). 
We use conservative version of this classification4. We convert the 
original classification, which is done for SITC codes into HS4 using 
UNCTAD conversion tables.   
According to the economic theory homogeneous goods are usually 
produced in competitive markets which are characterized by different 
level of concentration and entry rate than markets with differentiated 
products.  
Institutional and business environment variables 
EXP_COST it - Cost to export (US$ per container, in logs)  
EXP_DOC it - Documents to export (number) 
EXP_DUR it - Time to export (days)  
According to the heterogeneous firms trade theory high export costs 
increase the export cutoff level of productivity, i.e. decrease the 
number of firms that can export to overseas markets. Thus in countries 
with higher export costs we should observe fewer exporters and lower 
product and market diversification. 
FREE_TRADE it – Fraser Institute Index of freedom to trade 
internationally5.  
Index ranges from 0 (no freedom to trade internationally) to 10 
(maximum freedom to trade internationally) and is expected to affect 
both number of exporters and export diversification.  
FREE_REGUL it – Fraser Institute Index of regulatory environment. 
Index ranges from 0 (poor regulatory quality) to 10 (excellent 
regulatory environment). 
State of regulatory environment affects easiness of setting up a 
company as well as daily operating activities of the company. The 
better the regulatory environment the easier it is to set up and expand 
business.  
                                                          
4  We also used more liberal classification but the results did not change hence we 
stick only to the conservative one in the empirical analysis. 
5  2012 Economic Freedom Dataset, published in James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, 
and Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report,  Fraser 
Institute, available online at http://www.freetheworld.com/datasets_efw.html 
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CORRUPT_rank it – WGI “Control over Corruption” percentile rank 
among all countries. Indicator ranges from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest), 
where larger values of index being associated with better control over 
corruption and hence lower level of corruption in the country. 
Corruption imposes additional costs on all firms, including 
exporting ones, in the economy and hence is likely to be associated 
with a fewer opportunities for firms to trade internationally.    
The advantage of the Exporter database described earlier is that it 
contains data for countries at different stages of economic development 
(Table 2). GDP per capita ranges from mere 141 constant USD in 
Malawi to more than 40 thousand constant USD in Norway. Around 12 
percent of countries are landlocked which increases costs of exporting 
(correlation is more than 60%). Monetary and other costs of exporting 
do vary a lot across countries. While exporting costs per container are 
the lowest in Morocco, the highest costs are observed in a landlocked 
Uganda.  The simplest procedures for exporting are observed in Estonia 
where firms need only 3 documents and 5 days to export while 
exporting requires 12 documents and more than 50 days in Laos. There 
is also significant variation in the overall business and institutional 
environment across countries and also across time. For example, 
control over corruption rank of Senegal decreased by 16 points from 
2005 to 2006 while Tanzania, on the contrary, showed remarkable 
improvement in the rank by 20 points during the same period.   
The absence of tariff rates as the control variable deserves a separate 
explanation. It is common in the literature studying effect of the non-
tariff measures on the trade flows to include sector-specific tariff rates 
applied by countries to imports. This approach works well when 
bilateral trade flows or destination-specific dependent variables (like 
exit and entry rates) are used (e.g. Fontagné et al., 2013). In our case 
dependent variables describing export dynamics are aggregated across 
different destinations and hence it is unclear what tariff rates should be 
used. One way to deal with this would be to use a tariff rate averaged 
across destinations with country shares as weights. We used time 
dummy variables to account for any changes in other factors (including 
tariff rates) that might have influenced the export dynamics. Our 
negligence of tariff rates can be also justified by the findings of 
Fontagné et al. (2013) of no effect of tariff rates on the extensive and 
intensive margin for French exporters. The only effect (negative) of the 
tariff rates is observed for the trade unit values which are not subject of 
investigation in this paper. Also in Medin and Melchior (2014) the 
results are robust to exclusion of the tariff variable.  
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Econometric concerns 
One of the econometric problems that we face is possible endogeneity 
of the TBT and SPS measures: countries that experience increase in the 
number of importers can be prone to increase or to impose new trade 
barriers to prevent new entrants or drive some incumbents out. This 
problem is partially mitigated by the inclusion of the lagged values of 
the measures. Also our dependent variables differently from Fontagné 
et al. (2013) are not destination specific but are calculated across 
destinations for total exports of the country in a particular 4-digit 
sector. Hence even if country has a lot of exporters in one sector they do 
not all necessarily serve each destination. In our view this reduces 
endogeneity problem as the change in the average number of exporters 
across destinations is unlikely to be correlated with the possibility that 
specific country imposes a TBT or SPS measure in response to increase 
the number of foreign firms.  
As discussed in the previous section, first-differenced estimator can 
still be biased if strict exogeneity assumption is violated. In order to 
verify is this assumption holds a test for strict exogeneity suggested in 
Wooldridge (2002) is performed.6   
Another problem is a possible correlation of the regression 
residuals. Since we include aggregated independent variables (at sector 
level or country level) as controls for the changes in the dependent 
variables which are at more disaggregated level (country-sector level), 
it is reasonable to expect that, for example, sectors in the same country 
will share unobservable characteristics that are not captured by 
country-level variables. This would lead to the correlation/clustering of 
the regression disturbances making the regular standard errors from 
the estimation to be biased downward even at low levels of correlation 
(Moulton, 1990).  
To account for possible correlation of the standard errors we use 
Liang and Zeger (1986) clustered standard errors as suggested by 
Angrist and Pischke (2008). This approach works well in our case as we 
have sufficient number of clusters that ensures consistency of the 
clustered variance estimator.  
                                                          
6  The test failed to reject hypothesis of strict exogeneity in majority of the 
specifications. 
 Results 
5.1. Introduction of a TBT/SPS measure 
The results for all exports are presented in Table 3a. The most 
important result from our analysis is that introduction of a TBT or an 
SPS measure does not seem to affect sectoral export dynamics. Only in 
once case a TBT dummy is significant and is positive (column 3) 
implying that introduction of a technical barrier is associated with the 
increase in the average number of products per exporter.  
Absence of the effect is obviously at odds with the previous 
empirical papers mentioned in Introduction. Firm-level studies and 
cross-country studies do find negative effect of the non-tariff measures 
and TBTs and SPS measures in particular on trade volumes as well as 
on export diversification (Shepherd, 2007; Fontagné et al, 2013, etc.) 
What possibly can explain this zero effect? First, sector dynamic 
variables that we use in our analysis may not capture well changes in 
behavior of economic agents (firms): while marginal firms may be 
affected by technical barriers and SPS, averaging across firms may 
actually conceal this. This explanation would be in line with country 
studies that use firm-level data and do find the effect of the NTMs on 
exporters’ behavior (e.g. Fontagné et al., 2013). Nevertheless the 
advantage of our analysis is that it looks at the issue of the NTMs in the 
cross-country perspective: we investigate changes at relatively 
disaggregated level (4-digit product lines). Second, the effect of the 
introduction of an NTM measure may not be felt immediately (in one 
year). In order to verify this, we lagged trade barriers variables two 
periods but the results were unchanged. Third, it may be the case that it 
is the number of measures (or countries maintaining) that matters. In 
order to address this point we performed the same type of analysis 
using two other trade variables defined above as the number of new 
measures introduced. The results are discussed later in the paper.  
The control variables as expected seem to influence export dynamics 
though the extent of this effect varies across export dynamics 
dimensions. While increase in the country size is associated with the 
decrease in product and market diversification and increase in the exit 
rate, change in the level of economic development does not seem to 
affect exports dynamics. Sector size (relative total exports) is associated 
with the larger number of exporting firms and lower probability for 
them to exit from exporting. Importantly, costs of exporting both in 
terms of money and time appear to affect exports diversification at 
product level and firms’ entry and exit rate. Thus, if export costs per 
container increase by 1% (slightly more than 11 dollars) the exit rate 
from exporting increases by almost 4 percent, ceteris paribus. Simi-
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larly, additional documents required for exporting reduces the number 
of products shipped by an average exporter. At the same time, a 
positive coefficient on time to export variable in the regression with the 
entry rate as dependent variable (column 6) seems to be at odds with 
economic logic: increase in entry rate is positively associated with the 
increase in the time required to export. Improvement in the overall 
regulatory environment is linked to more destination-diversified 
exports. On the other hand, some results for institutional variables are 
unexpected and even puzzling: for example, larger freedom to trade 
internationally seems to reduce the number of exporters as well as the 
number of destination markets.  
In line with the economic theory, firms try to move away from 
exporting less sophisticated products towards differentiated goods: 
number of exporters is falling for reference priced goods and new 
exporters are not likely to export homogeneous or referenced goods. 
The entry and exit rates for homogeneous and referenced goods are 
statistically significantly different than for the sectors with 
differentiated goods.   
Next, we restrict our sample first to food and then to fish and 
seafood sector only as the effect of NTM measures and especially SPS 
measures might be significant for these sectors. Again we find almost 
no effect of the NTMs on the export dynamic variables while the results 
for control variables are to some extent similar (Tables 3b and 3c). Con-
sistently with the Melitz-type models, introduction of an SPS measure 
reduces the number of destinations served by an average exporter. A 
TBT dummy is significant in only one case but has unexpected sign: 
introduction of a technical barrier is associated with the increase in the 
entry rate. Some earlier papers do find that non-tariff measures can 
have a positive effect on the exporting country (e.g. Moenius (2004) 
finds positive effect of NTM on manufacturing exports; Medin and 
Melchior, (2014) as well).  
Again, costs of exporting seem to be even more important determi-
nants of the market diversification and exporter concentration for 
exporters of foodstuff: each additional dollar that adds to container 
costs and each additional document required for exporting reduce 
market diversification (column 4). Also more developed (richer) 
economies seem to have more stable pool of exporters in the sector as 
the change in the exit rate is negatively associated with income change.  
As economies become richer their exports of foodstuff become less 
concentrated (Table 3b, column 2) as the new firms start exporting 
activities (column 6).        
The results for fish and seafood exports are even less conclusive, 
with no effect of TBT/SPS measures on exports dynamics and varying 
effect of institutional characteristics (Table 3c).   
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5.2. Changes in the number of TBT/SPS measures 
As discussed in the previous section, the two trade barriers dummy 
variables do not account for the number of the new measures 
introduced, which can have differential effects on exporters depending 
on how many such measures were put in place. Since this differential 
effect potentially can be important and can explain the absence of the 
results when trade barriers dummies are used we constructed continu-
ous variables measuring the change in the number of measures applied 
in the sector. Next we used those new NTMs variables to re-estimate the 
effect of the NTMs on export dynamics. The results for all exports and 
separately for foodstuff and fish and seafood industry are presented in 
Tables 4a-4c.    
 Again, except for a few cases the NTMs do not seem to be important 
drivers of exports dynamics. While increase in the number of SPS 
measures appears to have a positive significant effect on firm entry rate 
into exporting (column 6 in Tables 4a-4b), other dimensions like 
number of exporters and exports diversification are not affected. The 
only exception is found for fish and seafood exports product diversify-
cation on which two types of measures have opposite effect (Table 4c, 
column 3): whereas increase in technical barriers to trade decreases the 
number of products exported by an average firm, increase in SPS 
measures is associated with the increase in such number. The effect of 
the control variables on exports dynamics is mainly preserved:  again 
costs associated with exporting seem to be important determinants of 
the exports diversification.    
 
 Concluding remarks 
In this paper we look at the effect of the introduction of non-tariff 
measures, namely technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures on the degree of export diversification at 
firm, product and market level in the sectors affected by such meas-
ures. Our results of almost no effect are far from being conclusive. 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of the effect. First, 
aggregate dynamic variables may not capture well changes in behavior 
of economic agents (firms): while marginal firms may be affected by 
technical barriers and SPS, averaging across firms may actually hide 
this.  Second, the effect of the introduction of an NTM measure may not 
be felt immediately (in one year). Lack of evidence of the effect of NTBs 
on exports is in contrast to our other finding that home country’s 
business environment and institutional factors are important 
determinants of export performance. Monetary costs and more 
complicated exporting procedures seem to hamper product and market 
diversification. Hence policy makers, especially in developing 
countries should not be only concerned with removing external barri-
ers (like NTMs) to exports from their countries. Domestic policies 
should also aid at reduction of internal barriers and costs imposed on 
exporting firms by corrupted practices and burdensome regulatory 
procedures. 
. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics for export dynamics variables 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
NUM_EXP 35.695 94.406 0 3102 43730 
H-H_index 0.503 0.327 0.004 1 41206 
PROD_DIV 1.199 0.369 1 7 40642 
MARK_DIV 1.702 1.035 1 26 41206 
ENTRY 54.085 28.935 0 100 35813 
EXIT 52.286 29.175 0 100 35249 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for control variables 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
GDP_PCAP (log) 7.838 1.289 4.997 10.626 44522 
POP_TOT (log) 9.569 1.275 7.098 12.067 44665 
AGR_EMP, % 11.361 9.135 0.67 40.2 43542 
Landlocked 0.119 0.323 0 1 44665 
Importance, % 0.133 0.812 0 31.365 38531 
EXP_COST (log) 6.949 0.416 6.168 8.175 27852 
EXP_DOC 6.675 1.745 3 12 27852 
EXP_DUR 21.394 9.534 5 59 27852 
CORR_rank 51.601 25.541 4 99 44665 
FREE_REGUL 6.753 0.728 4.4 8.2 39579 
FREE_TRADE 7.366 0.942 4.4 9.3 39432 
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Table 3a. TBT/SPS Introduction: Empirical results for trade in all goods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
NUM_EXP 
H-H 
index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT (t-1) -0.202 0.000 0.004** 0.006 -0.265 0.462 
 [0.660] [0.003] [0.002] [0.009] [0.330] [0.429] 
SPS (t-1) -0.818 0.000 -0.007 -0.035 0.327 1.024 
 [1.624] [0.008] [0.008] [0.022] [1.256] [1.276] 
GDP_PCAP -4.030 -0.051 -0.017 -0.091 -10.469 2.577 
 [11.091] [0.039] [0.030] [0.160] [10.634] [6.637] 
POP_TOT -80.415 0.066 -0.257* -0.784* 94.435*** 2.655 
 [56.162] [0.148] [0.150] [0.432] [33.143] [27.631] 
Importance 1.286* 0.005 0.000 0.005 -0.576** 0.162 
 [0.699] [0.004] [0.003] [0.011] [0.278] [0.229] 
EXP_COST 11.150 -0.001 -0.031 -0.011 3.904*** 2.092 
 [7.015] [0.009] [0.020] [0.021] [1.235] [2.113] 
EXP_DOC 0.365 0.003 -0.008** 0.003 -0.344 -0.366 
 [1.060] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.296] [0.572] 
EXP_DUR 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.089 0.121* 
 [0.139] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.080] [0.063] 
Ref priced goods -1.579* 0.001 -0.004*** 0.009 0.717*** -0.321* 
 [0.806] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.250] [0.180] 
Homogeneous goods -2.733** -0.002 0.000 0.011 1.229*** -0.789** 
 [1.184] [0.004] [0.004] [0.010] [0.377] [0.375] 
CORR_rank 0.043 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.091** 0.072 
 [0.088] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.041] [0.061] 
FREE_REGUL 3.119 0.003 0.005 0.045** 1.861 0.205 
 [5.264] [0.007] [0.006] [0.019] [1.124] [1.240] 
FREE_TRADE -3.410 0.003 0.004 -0.069** 1.255 1.995 
 [3.507] [0.011] [0.008] [0.030] [1.908] [2.117] 
Constant 4.148* -0.003 0.006 0.041** -0.538 -0.649 
 [2.389] [0.004] [0.004] [0.015] [0.681] [0.719] 
       
Observations 70860 64450 63819 64450 65073 64175 
R-squared 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies, interaction terms of institutional indices with sector 
type are included (not reported). All variables (except for NTM 
variables and type of sector) are first differenced.  
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Table 3b. TBT/SPS Introduction: Empirical results for trade in foodstuff 
(Categories 1-22 in HS2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NUM_EX
P H-H index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT (t-1) 0.508 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -1.305 2.027* 
 [0.914] [0.008] [0.006] [0.027] [1.166] [1.160] 
SPS (t-1) 0.354 0.011 -0.001 -0.047* 2.037 0.210 
 [1.232] [0.011] [0.009] [0.024] [1.617] [1.242] 
GDP_PCAP 0.122 -0.158* 0.149 0.017 -19.493 28.191** 
 [8.377] [0.091] [0.093] [0.274] [15.739] [12.355] 
POP_TOT -29.193 0.322 -0.198 -0.999 37.940 45.533 
 [22.795] [0.376] [0.232] [1.420] [50.600] [57.177] 
AGRO_EMP  0.563 -0.003 0.001 0.023 -0.539 0.494 
 [0.476] [0.004] [0.003] [0.025] [0.574] [0.625] 
Importance 0.570 -0.007 -0.001 0.006 -0.343 0.926 
 [1.393] [0.004] [0.005] [0.029] [0.977] [0.980] 
EXP_COST -3.045** 0.085*** -0.026 0.252** 
7.651**
* -2.915 
 [1.471] [0.027] [0.018] [0.120] [2.244] [4.669] 
EXP_DOC -1.065 0.020 -0.004 0.040* -1.492 -2.090 
 [0.654] [0.012] [0.005] [0.023] [1.016] [1.868] 
EXP_DUR 0.053 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.230 0.281 
 [0.057] [0.002] [0.001] [0.006] [0.184] [0.170] 
Ref priced goods -0.887** 0.002 -0.009* 0.016 0.241 -0.851 
 [0.429] [0.005] [0.006] [0.028] [0.798] [0.743] 
Homogeneous goods 0.050 -0.012 -0.006 0.007 1.161 -1.012 
 [0.640] [0.011] [0.007] [0.015] [1.185] [0.781] 
CORR_rank -0.094 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 0.180 0.053 
 [0.059] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.183] [0.099] 
FREE_REGUL -1.454 0.019 -0.019 0.164* 7.171** -3.387 
 [1.903] [0.022] [0.016] [0.086] [2.784] [2.533] 
FREE_TRADE -1.556* -0.001 0.019* 0.053 0.985 -0.165 
 [0.772] [0.016] [0.011] [0.068] [2.097] [2.224] 
Constant 0.757 -0.008 -0.011 -0.027 0.094 -2.570 
 [0.644] [0.019] [0.015] [0.039] [2.670] [1.964] 
       
Observations 5356 4922 4899 4922 5014 4923 
R-squared 0.013 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.013 0.006 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies are included (not reported). All variables (except for 
NTM variables and type of sector) are first differenced. 
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Table 3c. TBT/SPS Introduction: Empirical results for trade in fish and seafood 
products  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
NUM_EXP H-H index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT (t-1) 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.887 
 [3.624] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [7.992] 
SPS (t-1) -4.304 0.019 -0.007 -0.062 4.214 3.268 
 [2.943] [0.035] [0.037] [0.051] [5.375] [3.788] 
GDP_PCAP -19.648 -0.225 0.454 1.628** -4.417 -115.982** 
 [31.004] [0.503] [0.609] [0.686] [62.570] [49.743] 
POP_TOT -8.529 0.887 4.677 -1.387 -194.660 -131.206 
 [59.255] [0.989] [2.855] [2.931] [198.438] [290.694] 
Landlocked  0.890 -0.020 -0.318 -0.167*** 1.184 3.492 
 [0.897] [0.032] [0.295] [0.058] [3.702] [16.687] 
Importance 1.870 0.025 -0.048* -0.166 -1.994 -3.556 
 [1.718] [0.022] [0.025] [0.181] [3.441] [3.302] 
EXP_COST 2.171 0.097 -0.200 -0.087 12.773 13.701 
 [2.891] [0.115] [0.131] [0.220] [16.991] [15.342] 
EXP_DOC 0.296 0.039 0.029 0.126 4.203 2.263 
 [1.320] [0.049] [0.060] [0.082] [5.070] [8.295] 
EXP_DUR -0.020 0.000 0.004 0.013** 0.334 -0.419 
 [0.104] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005] [0.367] [0.524] 
CORR_rank 0.077 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.179 -0.181 
 [0.129] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.208] [0.332] 
FREE_REGUL 4.826 -0.001 -0.058 0.117 2.727 13.982* 
 [3.685] [0.069] [0.099] [0.109] [7.727] [8.096] 
FREE_TRADE -1.913 0.020 0.063 -0.034 3.347 -2.061 
 [2.669] [0.032] [0.064] [0.061] [4.825] [4.626] 
Constant 0.281 0.010 -0.097 0.074 -0.030 4.965 
 [2.785] [0.034] [0.061] [0.061] [3.857] [4.899] 
       
Observations 329 311 311 311 311 308 
R-squared 0.035 0.023 0.073 0.083 0.02 0.021 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Year dummies are included (not reported). All variables (except for 
NTM variables and landlocked) are first differenced. 
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Table 4a. Change in the number of TBT/SPS: Empirical results for trade in all 
goods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES NUM_EX
P H-H index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT Change -0.182 0.002 -0.001 -0.012 0.468 0.686 
 [0.242] [0.004] [0.003] [0.009] [0.296] [0.625] 
SPS Change 0.260 -0.009 -0.013 0.019 0.680 2.597* 
 [0.488] [0.010] [0.010] [0.026] [1.007] [1.410] 
GDP_PCAP -19.280 0.023 0.278 0.334 4.863 32.153 
 [16.246] [0.148] [0.222] [0.527] [35.530] [24.897] 
POP_TOT -34.632 0.233 -1.648** -2.712 184.431 80.191 
 [35.944] [0.713] [0.626] [1.724] [114.475] [140.479] 
Importance 1.354** 0.004 -0.001 0.021 -0.018 -1.411 
 [0.611] [0.004] [0.006] [0.036] [1.810] [1.033] 
EXP_COST -0.802 -0.050 -0.228** -0.077 16.065* 16.934 
 [2.409] [0.067] [0.091] [0.166] [8.156] [12.337] 
EXP_DOC 0.561 -0.005 -0.015 0.000 -0.750 -3.757 
 [0.641] [0.026] [0.018] [0.027] [2.031] [2.275] 
EXP_DUR 0.079 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.956** 0.049 
 [0.122] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.387] [0.351] 
Ref priced goods -0.011 0.013 -0.014 -0.076 2.146 3.064 
 [0.418] [0.014] [0.014] [0.049] [1.845] [2.636] 
Homogeneous goods 0.833 -0.008 0.000 -0.029 2.476 1.752 
 [0.604] [0.015] [0.014] [0.045] [3.215] [2.736] 
CORR_rank 0.080 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.523 0.041 
 [0.058] [0.004] [0.002] [0.008] [0.431] [0.405] 
FREE_REGUL 1.305 -0.015 0.021 0.304** 11.024 -10.196 
 [2.221] [0.046] [0.079] [0.145] [7.566] [6.937] 
FREE_TRADE 1.980 -0.038 -0.005 -0.040 0.429 2.318 
 [1.413] [0.061] [0.044] [0.129] [5.617] [5.976] 
Constant 0.684 -0.026 0.012 0.182** -9.825*** -2.781 
 [0.721] [0.036] [0.021] [0.068] [2.618] [4.808] 
       
Observations 1,584 1,418 1,382 1,418 1,339 1,360 
R-squared 0.013 0.012 0.019 0.018 0.028 0.022 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies, interaction terms of institutional indices with sector 
type are included (not reported). All variables (except for NTM 
variables and type of sector) are first differenced.  
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Table 4b. Change in the number of TBT/SPS: Empirical results for trade in 
foodstuff (Categories 1-22 in HS2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
NUM_EXP H-H index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT Change -0.263 0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.569 0.575 
 [0.319] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.414] [0.742] 
SPS Change 0.241 -0.009 -0.012 0.019 0.592 2.528* 
 [0.494] [0.010] [0.010] [0.026] [1.010] [1.425] 
GDP_PCAP -24.029 0.015 0.295 0.243 14.201 34.940 
 [16.899] [0.150] [0.225] [0.557] [35.991] [25.641] 
POP_TOT -13.354 0.531 -1.881*** -2.215 160.376 77.205 
 [33.148] [0.782] [0.653] [2.040] [115.299] [130.240] 
AGRO_EMP  0.356 -0.009 -0.001 -0.011 -1.361 0.677 
 [0.492] [0.008] [0.008] [0.015] [1.554] [1.266] 
Importance 2.674 0.009 0.003 0.157*** 3.846* -3.234 
 [2.702] [0.015] [0.025] [0.046] [1.967] [2.662] 
EXP_COST -0.974 0.013 -0.201** 0.022 16.953* 14.607 
 [2.508] [0.054] [0.093] [0.177] [8.794] [13.254] 
EXP_DOC 0.616 0.015 -0.004 0.031 -0.539 -4.409 
 [0.710] [0.018] [0.017] [0.030] [2.321] [2.830] 
EXP_DUR 0.095 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.932** 0.144 
 [0.116] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.389] [0.390] 
Ref priced goods -0.138 0.007 -0.013 -0.089* 0.792 2.080 
 [0.494] [0.013] [0.015] [0.048] [1.547] [2.727] 
Homogeneous goods 0.807 -0.015 -0.001 -0.041 0.917 0.405 
 [0.613] [0.015] [0.015] [0.042] [3.172] [2.697] 
CORR_rank 0.104 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.192 0.041 
 [0.064] [0.004] [0.002] [0.006] [0.275] [0.396] 
FREE_REGUL 1.241 -0.007 0.028 0.249* 12.228 -9.420 
 [2.519] [0.050] [0.080] [0.131] [7.847] [6.386] 
FREE_TRADE 2.206 -0.039 -0.007 0.071 -0.654 0.352 
 [1.532] [0.067] [0.043] [0.109] [5.818] [5.661] 
Constant 0.202 -0.017 0.056* 0.155** 1.693 -11.647* 
 [1.033] [0.038] [0.029] [0.071] [3.757] [6.655] 
       
Observations 1,499 1,343 1,310 1,343 1,295 1,310 
R-squared 0.014 0.012 0.017 0.02 0.028 0.021 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Year dummies are included (not reported). All variables (except for 
NTM variables and type of sector) are first differenced. 
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Table 4c. Change in the number of TBT/SPS: Empirical results for trade in fish 
and seafood products 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
NUM_EXP H-H index 
PROD_ 
Div 
MARK_ 
Div ENTRY EXIT 
       
TBT Change -0.530 0.004 -0.015** 0.006 0.978 0.417 
 [0.400] [0.007] [0.007] [0.014] [1.105] [0.858] 
SPS Change 3.551 -0.012 0.089** -0.020 -9.492 -4.626 
 [2.515] [0.035] [0.039] [0.088] [6.093] [4.967] 
GDP_PCAP 7.770 -0.163 -0.006 1.233* -128.126** -79.783*** 
 [15.214] [0.445] [0.311] [0.663] [47.604] [28.299] 
POP_TOT 69.075 3.424 -1.586 -5.942 48.055 122.442 
 [56.087] [2.095] [1.861] [4.659] [189.246] [192.872] 
Landlocked  2.897** -0.048 -0.013 -0.070 -1.207 -14.814*** 
 [1.082] [0.051] [0.047] [0.084] [6.371] [4.938] 
Importance 4.323 -0.066* 0.063 0.014 1.070 3.291 
 [3.981] [0.035] [0.098] [0.122] [4.571] [3.174] 
EXP_COST 3.567 -0.014 -0.333* 0.271 18.796 4.535 
 [10.712] [0.322] [0.180] [0.318] [31.361] [22.246] 
EXP_DOC 0.188 -0.089 -0.098* 0.112 9.402 4.816 
 [2.428] [0.102] [0.048] [0.159] [7.998] [14.247] 
EXP_DUR -0.018 0.009 0.007 -0.022 1.239 -0.523 
 [0.388] [0.010] [0.012] [0.027] [0.989] [1.223] 
CORR_rank 0.120 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.243 0.034 
 [0.113] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.378] [0.215] 
FREE_REGUL 2.024 0.000 0.075 0.089 14.290* 6.754 
 [2.360] [0.059] [0.063] [0.109] [7.707] [5.719] 
FREE_TRADE 0.882 0.017 0.133** -0.099 -10.452 -5.043 
 [3.098] [0.065] [0.051] [0.128] [10.464] [6.812] 
Constant -2.781* -0.033 0.032 0.070 4.108 0.811 
 [1.496] [0.021] [0.026] [0.064] [3.555] [2.856] 
       
Observations 284 266 254 266 256 260 
R-squared 0.05 0.038 0.041 0.042 0.063 0.045 
        
Note:  Robust standard errors (clustered at country level) in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Appendix 
List of countries in the WB Exporter Dynamics Database 
 Albania 
 Belgium 
 Burkina Faso 
 Bangladesh 
 Bulgaria 
 Botswana 
 Chile 
 Cameroon 
 Colombia 
 Costa Rica 
 Dominican Republic 
 Ecuador 
 Egypt 
 Spain 
 Estonia 
 Guatemala 
 Iran, Islamic Rep. 
 Jordan 
 Kenya 
 Cambodia 
 Kuwait 
 Lao PDR 
 Lebanon 
 Morocco 
 Mexico 
 Macedonia, FYR 
 Mali 
 Mauritius 
 Malawi 
 Niger 
 Nicaragua 
 Norway 
 Pakistan 
 Peru 
 Portugal 
 Senegal 
 El Salvador 
 Turkey 
 Tanzania 
 Uganda 
 Yemen, Rep. 
 South Africa 
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